Sohail Karmani's paper (2005) entitled 'English, ''terror'' and Islam' made a compelling case against the role of English in the demonization of Islam and the perpetuation of western hegemony, and he made an equally strong case for more explicit awareness of the ideologies underlying ELT practices. Although I find myself in general agreement with Karmani's position, I think his paper left a lot of issues unexplored. So, the objective of this paper is to examine some important implications of the relatively undertheorized issue of how the global spread of English is received and acted upon. Drawing on what I call 'the power potential' inherent in any language, I argue that, instead of considering English and its putative hegemonic discourses as an inhibitive and imposed encumbrance, we need to take into account how the language is constantly and unpredictably appropriated and creatively reshaped and expropriated to give voice to emerging agencies and subjectivities. In conclusion, I suggest that appropriation, far from being drenched in a confrontational idiom, is a move towards new sites of collaboration and contestation, towards much wider human possibilities.
conflict with the worldviews of our Muslim learners ' (2005: 266) , and, quite wisely, advises us to be 'perpetually aware of how our current language teaching paradigms relate to the political, cultural and economic aspirations of the host culture' (ibid.). Karmani thus believes that the teaching of English, as an exercise in linguistic imperialism and cultural politics, perpetuates western (mainly American) influence and hegemony, and will, as a consequence, lead to cultural alienation, notably de-Islamization. In this paper, I will further explore some important issues which Karmani understandably left in the background, and hope to fruitfully contribute to the current debate on the politics of the global spread of English.
Policing and legislation in English will domesticate the deleterious minds of others. The teaching of English will eventually result in de-Islamization. To put it bluntly, the view of language implicit in both Johnson's and Karmani's conceptualizations is firmly ensconced in the Conduit Metaphor (Reddy 1979) : ideas are objects, language is a container, communication is sending. So, the argument goes, discourse enactment is in itself a guarantee of its desired reception; intention on one end squarely fits interpretation on the other, a neat linguistic assembly line. This view corners discourse receivers in a hopelessly passive and helpless position in stark denial of human agency and subjectivity. But this, one might rightly ask, is too liberal. Is it?
To say that individuals exercise agency and bring their subjectivities to bear on the discourse and that discourse is not of necessity constitutive of those subjectivities does not entail that language is a neutral system of human semiosis. Language use is value-laden and ideological. But so too is language interpretation. It is no less seasoned by a myriad of ideological and idiosyncratic considerations. Occasions may arise where such value systems coexist more or less in harmony. But there may also be times when they are at odds, where intention is not, as it were, ratified. These matters are common characteristics of daily linguistic behavior. They are also common at the macro-level of discourse, ideology and power. Tyrannies, including empires, to the salvation of humanity, are not unanimously met with consent. Of course, miniature regimes of discourse do exist in various walks of life, and they seem to be exercising power and control; constituencies are erected and every effort is invested to maintain them. But soon dissent breaks surface, giving way to a new reality. Likewise, readers/listeners may be 'framed' in the discourse structure through a process of 'naturalization' (Fairclough 1992) . However, they very often have the propensity to discredit our expectations, and cease to 'cooperate' employing, to use a Cicourel term, 'interpretative procedures', albeit of a defensive kind. It follows, therefore, that the production of any discourse, however cunningly camouflaged, does not by any means warrant its desired reception. And this of course applies to the teaching of English, to which I will turn now.
Learning English, following Karmani's argument, carries with it a risk of cultural alienation. Learners are exposed to a language embodying values in conflict with their own, and are drawn, by coercion or the alluring fascination of the foreign, to abandon their values and embrace those of others. Speaking a language may mean subscribing to a specific world view, but this may, on close scrutiny, turn out to be a strategic manoeuvre, and not, as we are more readily inclined to belive, an irrevocable determinism. 'Evidence' from some corners of applied linguistics research bears witness to this, namely contrastive rhetoric (Kaplan 1966; Connor 1996) and Interlanguage Pragmatics (Beebe et al. 1990; Kasper 1992) . Even fairly 'advanced' learners of English seem to rely on their L1 perceptions of the world when it comes to rhetorical patterns, politeness, directness and socio-pragmatics. To claim that language is to be held accountable for cultural alienation is to indulge in some kind of pan-linguicism, where language is constitutive of all human experience, and the latter is explicable solely through language. It is equally doubtful whether learning a language necessarily perpetuates domination and hegemony, which leads us to the next point.
What the orientalist-sounding British historian seems to ignore is the fact that English, paradoxically, proffers the resources, not only to resist attempts at domination, alienation, etc., but to produce a new reality as well. English, like any language, is flexible; you can model it the way you want. It is also reflexive; you can turn it on against itself. Language is, to use a martial term, a 'loaded weapon' (Bolinger 1980) . So, language, English in our case, can be appropriated to be at the service of those who use it (and, I should add, those who interpret it). This process of appropriation, as the literature on world Englishes patently shows, concerns areas of lexico-grammar, where the new language accommodates grammatical relations, semantic concepts, collocations, and colligations hitherto unrealized in the system (Nelson 2006) , thereby exploiting what Widdowson calls 'the virtual language ' (2003: 48-9) . In his oft-quoted statement, Achebe has this to say: I feel that the English language will be able to carry the weight of my African experience. But it will have to be a new English, still in communion with its ancestral home but altered to suit its new African surroundings. (Achebe 1975: 62) These alterations may of course come in all linguistic shapes. But I think that what Achebe had in mind was that English, the brand linguistically sanctioned by its native community, will be able to express cognitions, affects, modes of thinking, etc., not of its ancestral home, but of an African provenance. This comes through a process of 'recontextualization' of the language, which gives rise to new actualities of meaning deployed to 'represent' the new reality. An example of this is African post-colonial literature (of which Achebe is an outstanding figure) which 'recontextualized' English (and other colonial languages) to give voice to African worldliness. It then developed as a distinctive genre with its own thematic configurations and literary qualities. But, this evolution, one might argue, has moved far beyond generic distinctiveness to establish a new order of reality: a counter-discourse, thus moving from representation to re-presentation. This is the other aspect of appropriation that I would like to explore. This, I call 'the power potential'. Like the other types, the 'power potential' is latent in any language system, ready to be realized to construct, resist and reconstruct discourses and power of all sorts. It would seem, as pointed out at the beginning of this paper, that Caliban in Shakespeare's The Tempest did just the same when he turned the language, supposedly a domesticating technology, into a lethal weapon against Prospero, his master. Prospero's 'ideology' was to make him an effective slave through the teaching of English (discourse). But it seems that Caliban had a quite different agenda, an 'inbuilt ideology'. Much to the chagrin of his master, Caliban seemed to have exploited the power potential inherent in the words to reconstruct the power relationship. Of course, you can bludgeon Caliban into restive submission, as Prospero indeed did, but you cannot preclude him from appropriating the language to suit his ends (which include designs on Prospero's much loved daughter, Miranda!). Similarly, you can discipline the word, confine it in grammar books and dictionaries, and design a technology to perpetuate its hegemony. But it will never do to straightjacket its power potential.
I would argue then that 'reproducing and delivering ideologies that are in conflict with the views of our Muslim learners' cannot be taken at face value. Whether we like it or not, learners (Muslim or other) bring their own 'hidden curriculum' to the learning process. Like Caliban the pupil, they have minds of their own. Their profit on learning the language is to endow their own purposes with words. When these purposes are incommensurable, learners, quite naturally, prioritize their own. A very interesting instance of this is given by Paul Armstrong in a very perceptive account of the late Edward Said's memoir Out of Place (Armstrong 2003) . In his early school years, Said experienced a disquieting discomfort at being excluded and stigmatized as an 'outsider' by the Western (American) Other. What is peculiar about the story, though, is how the young Said appropriated the very tools of domination to fight back. Interestingly, it is books, music and film that made possible this space of protest, criticism and solace; even more, it is Western music, especially European music and Said's beloved opera but also, surprisingly, American films with heavy colonial overtones, like the Tarzan series and Arabian Nights-which shows that cultural resources of imperialism can be employed for other purposes than domination and hegemony (Armstrong 2003: 111) .
Learners, like Said, are able to and do use language, an obviously essential imperial resource, for purposes other than the ones which serve subjugation and hegemony and, more importantly, for resistance and appropriation. And they need no ghost from the grave to tell them this (see also Canagarajah (1999) for a similar account concerning Tamilization).
3 But Karmani (2005: 265) seems to be pointing us to a quite different solution. One way to avoid reproducing such ideologies is to be 'perpetually aware of how our current language teaching paradigms relate to the political, cultural and economic aspirations of the host culture'. First, it is not clear what is meant by current language teaching paradigms (focus on form, task-based instruction, ESP, lexical approach, critical pedagogies?). More importantly, there is the implicit assumption that there is consensus on what those aspirations are and on how they relate to English.
To begin with, those aspirations are matters of opinion and interestedness. And as a result, they are not so easy to disentangle, let alone to reconcile. First of all, there seems to be perennial tension between the cultural and the economic; between conservatism and pragmatism. While English seems to represent a threat to local languages and cultures, it is also considered an instrument to access knowledge and economic power. Likewise, English is seen as a tool to engage in international political relations and solving national conflicts while at the same time it is considered a form of dependency (Pennycook 1994a) . 4 Of course, these positions may change. For instance, we may see a move from conservatism to pragmatism as with Muslims in India (Rahman 2002) . A swing in the opposite direction is also conceivable; Ngugi is a living testimony (Pennycook 1994a: 259) . But whatever the change, the fact remains that the political, economic, and cultural are always in tension. And one cannot have it both ways. Another example.
Since independence, Morocco gradually adopted a policy of Arabization, where Arabic was promoted as the language of national identity, education and institutional communication. It was an attempt to break with the French colonial heritage, a decolonization of the mind. Arabization failed on many counts. First, it failed to appreciate just what national identity was since it excluded a large Berber-speaking population. Second, it resulted in a less than adequate educational system and unqualified workforce. Most importantly, Arabization engendered conflicting attitudes (Bentahila 1983; Ennaji 1988 ). Bentahila (1983: 123-4) refers to four tendencies regarding attitudes to Arabization: first, the traditionalists, whose purpose is to maintain the Arabic language and protect the local cultural heritage (cultural conservatism); second, the modernists, who want to expose Moroccans to efficient education through French (pragmatism); third, the nationalists, who consider Arabization as a political and post-colonial problem rather than a cultural or economic problem (political conservatism); fourth, the bureaucrats, who acknowledge the importance of Arabization but are skeptical about its feasibility (political pragmatism). The parallels with English are obvious, and therefore the issue need not be labored any further.
Another area of difficulty about Karmani's discussion is his perfect juxtaposition of Islam and English as if the two constitute 'incommensurable discourses' (Pennycook 1994b) . To begin with, there seem to be at least some similarity between the two. Both English and Islam are global phenomena. Second, both are expansionist. And both have a colonial history. This applies mutatis mutandis to Arabic. Interestingly though, Arabic and Islam constitute an indissociable adjacency pair in a way that, say, Christianity and English do not (cf. Pennycook and Coutand-Marin 2003) . So, pinning down one of the two as a demon to one extreme to defend the other helps to inadvertently perpetuate such dichotomies and their putative discourses, which eventually leaves us locked up in Blake's 'mind-forg'd manacles'.
One alternative to this would be to see both English and Islam, not as monolithic, essentialized and reified phenomena, but as different ways of pursuing understanding, sets of enquiries for making sense of the world. And like all other forms of meaning, both are elusive, fluid, evolving, and fuzzy categories. Nevertheless, this does not make of them incorrigible oppositions. Quite the contrary. There is, I think, room for reconciliation, cross-fertilization, and for what Homi Bhabha calls a 'third space', which is 'as unrepresentable in itself, where the symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity, where the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricized and read anew' (Bhabha 1995: 67-8) .
The concept of appropriation, so conceived, is a rehistoricization of the relationship between Islam and English. It is, in the words of Edward Said, a 'contrapuntal reading' (1993: 59-60) which involves a continual dialogue between the seemingly oppositional dimensions of worldliness, an interstitial area most concerned with the inter-discursivity of cultural representation. It is, in my view, this appropriation that provides the 'voyage in' (Said 1993: 261) , a new site of collaboration and contestation which, rather than being corrosive and drenched in the 'rhetoric of blame ' (1993: 262) , is a subtle move towards larger and more generous human realities of community and intertwined histories, and towards human liberation. What comes across loud and clear then are the vast landscapes for 'hybridity' and rapprochement which, far from dehumanizing and inferiorizing selfhoods, extend the human experiences and realities of our learners, and which, alone, are able to carry out inter-identitarian dialogue, without which, I take it, the prospects of a better world are horrifyingly dim. Hence the discourse of appropriation. I offer it in the hope of a peaceful world.
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NOTES
1 It seems that those who are most strident in their vilification of English continue to publish in the same language, and, ipso facto, conspire against their own positions. 
